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The Impact of the Charter; 
Untangling the Effects of Institutional Change1 
Abstract 
This article provides an overview of the main debates on the impact of the 
Charter's entrenchment in Canadian politics. In doing so, it casts a wide net, 
providing a selective exploration of the impact of the Charter in three main 
areas: 1) public policy; 2) political institutions and 3) political mobilization. 
The paper argues that we should move away from thinking about the Charter 
as a constitutional document that sets out rights that are protected by courts 
and move towards a view of the Charter as a structuring influence on 
Canadian political debate. In policy terms, the paper examines the 
instrumental impact of the Charter on criminal law and on lesbian and gay 
rights. While the Chapter has strengthened the hand of the judiciary relative to 
other political institutions, the discursive and instrumental effects of the 
Charter are also felt in other political institutions such as the executive and 
Parliament as well as the operation of federalism. Perhaps most importantly, 
the Charter has become an important factor in structuring political 
mobilization and debate, encouraging civil society organizations to stake 
their political claims in terms of Charter rights (for better or ill) and 
contributing to the partisan competition between political parties in federal 
politics. 
Résumé 
Cet article présente un aperçu des principaux débats qui ont eu lieu sur 
Vincidence de Venchâssement de la Charte dans la Constitution canadienne. 
Il ratisse large, car l * auteure yprocède à un examen sélectif de l'impact de la 
Charte dans trois domaines principaux : 1) la politique publique; 2) les 
institutions politiques; 3) la mobilisation politique. L'auteure soutient que 
nous devrions cesser de considérer la Charte comme un document 
constitutionnel qui énonce les droits protégés par les tribunaux et la voir 
comme une influence structurante sur le débat politique canadien. Sur le plan 
des politiques, le document examine Vincidence instrumentale de la Charte 
sur le droit pénal et les droits des gais et lesbiennes. Bien que la Charte ait 
accru l'importance du pouvoir judiciaire par rapport aux autres institutions 
politiques, les effets discursifs et instrumentaux de la Charte se font également 
sentir sur les autres institutions politiques comme le pouvoir exécutif et le 
Parlement ainsi que sur le fonctionnement du fédéralisme. Ce qui est 
peut-être encore plus important, la Charte est devenue un facteur important 
de structuration de la mobilisation et du débat politiques, qui encourage les 
organismes de la société civile à faire valoir leurs revendications politiques 
en fonction des droits conférés par la Charte (pour le meilleur ou pour le pire) 
et qui contribue à la concurrence partisane entre les partis politiques fédéraux. 
International Journal of Canadian Studies /Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
36,2007 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
Introduction 
Rights have become increasingly important in liberal democracies since 
World War II. It has become commonplace to assert that, like other 
countries, Canada has undergone a "rights revolution"2 in which, 
increasingly, political claims are discursively defined and constructed in 
terms of rights. Since the 1960s, a wave of social movement activists and 
political actors, including the women's movement, the lesbian and gay 
movement, the Quebec and Aboriginal nationalist movements, and 
movements representing ethnocultural communities, have put forth claims 
in Canadian politics that are based on assertions of rights, whether national 
rights, collective rights, or individual rights. This article explores this 
contemporary move toward human rights by providing a selective 
overview of the impact of the entrenchment of a constitutional bill of rights 
in the Canadian Constitution—the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms—on public policy, political institutions, and political mobilization. 
Unlike the anemic Bill of Rights that preceded it, the Charter has turned 
out to be a muscular document, one that has exerted important and complex 
effects on Canadian politics, effects that we are only now beginning to 
discern, twenty-five years after its enactment. The move toward the 
constitutional entrenchment of individual and collective rights and the 
empowerment of courts as the institutional mechanism for enforcing and 
protecting such rights has occurred over the same period in other 
democracies as well. This international trend toward whatpolitical scientist 
Ran Hirschl has called "judicial empowerment"3 has increasingly created a 
space for judicialized and legalized politics. 
This article provides an overview of the main debates on the impact of the 
Charter's entrenchment in Canadian politics. In doing so, it casts a wide 
net, providing a selective exploration of the impact of the Charter on public 
policy, political institutions, and political mobilization. I argue that we 
should move away from thinking about the Charter as a constitutional 
document that sets out rights that are protected by courts and move towards 
a view of the Charter as a structuring influence on Canadian political 
debate. The article builds on the insights of the new historical work on the 
evolution of human rights in Canada, which clearly shows the evolution of 
political and social support for stronger human rights4 protections in 
Canadian society from the 1920s to the 1960s. From a historical 
perspective, debates on the Charter may be viewed as the coûtinuation of 
earlier struggles over human rights, such as the campaign by Chinese 
Canadians and their allies for the repeal of the immigration ban in the 1920s; 
the campaign by Jewish labour organizers in Toronto and Montreal in the 
1930s and 1940s against racism and fascism; the campaign by African 
Canadians against segregation in public facilities; tie campaign by 
Japanese Canadians and their allies against internment, deportation, and 
forced internal migration; the campaign by church organizations and 
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intellectuals for civil liberties in the 1930s and 1940s; and the campaign by 
women's organizations in Ontario for equal pay for equal work in the 
1950s.5 This important new research shows the ways in which human rights 
became intimately woven into Canadian political institutions and political 
discourse over time. In keeping with the temperament of recent historical 
scholarship, the article shows the intertwining of institutions, policy, and 
politics in the making of the new human rights regime in Canada. The 
article is divided into three main sections which discuss the Charter's 
effects in each of these areas: public policy, political institutions, and 
political mobilization. 
The Effect of the Charter on Public Policy 
The Charter has had a significant impact on the evolution of public policy 
since its entrenchment, altering the policy process and shaping policy in a 
number of areas. The Charterhzs been interpretedby the courts in ways that 
have produced certain substantive policy outcomes that might not have 
otherwise been produced or, if they had been produced, might have taken a 
different form or might have taken longer to enact. Nonetheless, the 
Charter's impact lies not only in its direct instrumental impacts on 
policy—that is, on the way in which courts require that governments alter 
their policies and procedure to conform to the Charter—but also in the 
discursive effects of changing public policy by means of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. I will explore these two types of policy effects— 
instrumental and discursive—through the discussion of two of the most 
important areas of substantive policy change under the Charter, namely, 
changes in the area of criminal law and changes in the area of equality rights 
for lesbians and gay men and same-sex couples. 
The area of criminal law has been one of the major areas of Charter 
litigation. In quantitative terms, about two-thirds of Charter cases concern 
criminal law and the Court has been, most likely to strike down state 
practices that violate the Charter in the area of criminal law than in any 
other area.6 While legislatures have the right to use the notwithstanding 
clause to override the Court's decisions on Charter issues, this weapon is 
rarely used.7 In the area of criminal law, the Court rules very directly on the 
behaviour of state actors such as the police and may directly terminate the 
prosecution of an accused citizen, order their release, and exclude evidence, 
if the Court rules that it has been obtained in a way that violates the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter. Therefore, in the area of criminal law, the Court 
has more power to directly implement its decisions through its impact on an 
ongoing prosecution than might be true in other areas.8 
Using these strong levers, the Charter has reshaped specific areas of 
criminal law. Under the Charter, people cannot be detained unreasonably, 
held without habeas corpus, or denied the right to counsel. Court rulings 
have set limits on police behaviour in stopping people without cause, on the 
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exclusion of evidence in criminal trials, and on searches. In the area of 
police investigations, court rulings have set limits on the detention and 
questioning of suspects. The Charter has been interpreted by the courts 
such that the police may only detain people on the basis of statutes such as 
the Highway Traffic Act or on the basis of common law9 (and, in this case, 
the police must have a reasonable suspicion of recent or ongoing criminal 
behaviour10). Charter jurisprudence provides strong guarantees of the 
accused's right to be informed of the right to consult counsel without delay, 
the opportunity to consult counsel,11 and right to legal aid.12 Further, the 
courts have ruled that searches without a warrant are not reasonable, they 
have set limits on the wearing of a wire, videotaping, or entering a home to 
make an arrest, and they have ruled that certain evidence may be excluded if 
it was not collected in a reasonable way. In response, Parliament has 
refashioned criminal law to accord with the Charter by specifying the 
procedures under which warrants are issued and by specifying exceptions 
for extreme circumstances.13 
The Charter has also shaped the criminal trial process in many areas, 
clarifying and setting limits on prosecutorial behaviour. A notable issue in 
this area is the rape shield law in which those accused of rape may cite the 
complainant's past sexual history. While the court under the Charter has 
held that the accused should have the right to present a case claiming an 
honest understanding that consent had occurred, Parliament replied to this 
ruling by setting out legislation that balanced the right of the accused 
against the interests of victims of sexual assault in reporting crime, as well 
as in the right to privacy and other rights.14 Another area in which the 
Charterhas set limits on criminal law is in the area of the fundamental rights 
of free expression and free assembly. In the area of pornography, for 
example, the Court ruled that free expression may be limited in response to 
a reasonable apprehension of the harm resulting from pornography or child 
pornography, although the Court allowed a defence of artistic, educational, 
or scientific merit. In addition, certain forms of hate speech may also be 
criminally prohibited as a reasonable limit on freedom of expression.15 
In sum, the Charter's clear enunciation of legal rights in sections 7-14 
has not only provided some new protections for the accused, it has clarified 
previously existing protections. In response to Charter rulings on issues 
such as the exclusion of evidence or the conduct of searches without a 
warrant, the government has had to consider how to craft criminal law 
legislation that will deal with the limits set out by the courts. This has led to 
greater oversight of police and prosecutorial conduct. 
In terms of the discursive effects of the Charter in the area of criminal 
law, the Charter has moved the conversation in the direction of the rights of 
the accused. This issue has become politicized as the post-Charter area of 
Canadian politics has seen the rise of populist right-wing politics through 
the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance and the re-founded Conservative 
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Party of Canada. The right-wing parties have attacked the Charter and the 
courts for upholding the rights of criminals at the expense of the rights of the 
accused.16 Taking a page from American debates on "law and order" 
(debates that arose in a very different context),17 right-wing populists have 
argued that the courts have moved the criminal law too far in the direction of 
the rights of criminals. At the same time, the women's movement is also 
deeply concerned with the shifts in criminal law in the direction of the rights 
of the accused and victims' rights groups have also called attention to their 
view that the system pays too much attention to the rights of criminals at the 
expense of the rights of the accused. 
In his work on the impact of the Charter on criminal law, James Kelly 
argues that judicial activism in the area of legal rights and criminal law 
demonstrates that the courts have been far more willing to limit the power of 
the police as unelected officials than to strike at the decisions of elected 
officials such as the cabinet or Parliament. Indeed, the courts are more 
deferential to the wishes of governments when money is involved, as cases 
such as pay equity and health spending show. Kelly argues that the framers 
of the Charter intended to limit police powers and to inject an element of 
American-style due process into police practices. Yet, Kelly argues, the 
framers of the Charter did not intend to take Canada to the extreme of U.S. 
due process at the expense of victims' rights. Rather, the intention was to 
create the constitutional context for a balanced approach to criminal law.x 8 
In the area of lesbian and gay rights and same-sex relationship 
recognition, there can be little doubt that the entrenchment of the Charter 
had a powerful effect on the evolution of public policy, both instrumentally 
and discursively. In instrumental terms, the courts using the Charter have 
pushed the policy debate in the direction of full human rights protections for 
lesbians and gay men and in the direction of full recognition of the rights and 
obligations of civil legal marriage for same-sex couples. While the impact 
of the Charter on criminal law is found most particularly in sections 7-14 of 
the Charter that outline the legal rights of Canadians, the evolution of 
public policy in the area of lesbian and gay human rights is located in section 
15 of the Charter, which protects equality rights on a range of enumerated 
grounds. The purpose of section 15 was to strengthen human rights 
protection in Canadian constitutional law, a goal that had long been 
articulated by many diverse groups in Canadian society and that, at the time 
of the debate on the Charter's entrenchment, was very strongly expressed 
by the women's movement, First Nations, and a broad range of 
ethnocultural communities. During debates on the proposed Charter in the 
parliamentary committee in the winter of 1980-81, Svend Robinson, NDP 
MP, asked then Justice Minister Jean Chrétien if the wording of enumerated 
grounds in the Charter might be extended to include sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination. In the exchange between Chrétien and 
Robinson, it was clear that, by leaving the list of enumerated grounds in 
section 15 open-ended, the authors of the Charter intended to permit the 
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courts to "read in" analogous grounds of discrimination. When pressed on 
the question of including sexual orientation in the proposed Charter, 
Chrétien commented that it would be up to the courts to decide to read in 
sexual orientation as an analogous ground of discrimination under section 
15.19 
In the early years of Charter litigation under section 15, it was not clear 
how the section would be applied to cases of sexual orientation 
discrimination. While Quebec had included sexual orientation in its human 
rights legislation in 1977, the idea that sexual orientation discrimination 
should be prohibited gained currency through debates over the Charter as 
influential human rights actors such as the Canadian and Ontario human 
rights commissions came out in favour of the amendment of provincial and 
federal human rights legislation to prohibit such discrimination.20 In early 
Charter cases in the late eighties and early nineties such as Veysey21 Haig & 
Birch,22 and Mossop23 courts ruled that the exclusion of sexual orientation 
from the Canadian Human Rights Act violated section 15, the equality 
rights guarantees of the Charter. As a result of these decisions, it was widely 
understood in the legal community that sexual orientation had been "read 
into" the Charter of Rights and into the Canadian Human Rights Act 
through court decisions, despite the lack of a formal federal legislative 
amendment to the Act and despite the lack of a ruling from the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Canadian Human Rights Commission itself was a 
strong supporter of the inclusion of sexual orientation within its ambit and 
immediately recognized the implications of the Veysey and Haig & Birch 
decisions by accepting over two hundred complaints based on sexual 
orientation after 1992.24 
In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled in Egan25 its first case on sexual 
orientation discrimination of the post-Charter era. In this case, the Court 
ruled that sexual orientation was analogous to the other grounds of 
discrimination enumerated in section 15 and that, therefore, the power of 
the Charter would apply in this area of discrimination. However, the Court 
also ruled that the denial of spousal benefits to Egan and Nesbit was 
justifiable under the reasonable limits clause of section 1 of the Charter26 
The possibility that the equality rights in section 15 of the Charter could be 
overridden by section 1 's general limitation sparked the mobilization of a 
litigation coalition among groups including Egale, the main lesbian and gay 
rights group at the federal level, and other section 15 stakeholders, such as 
the Canadian Ethnocultural Council. 
Changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court of Canada and 
mobilization by section 15 stakeholders seemed to bear fruit in the VriendP 
decision in 1998, which, along with theMv//28 decision of 1999, marked a 
turning point in the jurisprudence on lesbian and gay equality rights claims 
underthe Charter, In Vriend, the Court ruled that Alberta had to permit gays 
and lesbians to have recourse to provincial human rights legislation and to 
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hear the complaint of Delwin Vriend, a gay teacher who had been fired from 
his job. In the case of M v. H, the Court ruled that same-sex relationships 
were subject to the same spousal obligations as heterosexual common-law 
relationships upon breakup. In Vriend and MvH, the Court affirmed that 
sexual orientation was analogous to other grounds of discrimination in 
section 15 and moved away from the analysis of Egan by ruling that 
discrimination could not be justified under the reasonable limits clause of 
the Charter in section 1. In response to the M v H decision, the federal 
government reviewed all federal statutes and passed blanket legislation in 
2000 to include same-sex couples in all federal legislation.29 
From this turning point, the door was open for the recognition of 
same-sex marriage, an issue that was litigated under the Charter from 1999 
to 2004, resulting in the passage of federal legislation legalizing same-sex 
marriage in June 2005. Tliere can be little doubt that, without pressure from 
the courts, the Liberal government would not have moved so far so fast in 
the recognition of same-sex relationships. While the decisions of the courts 
could have been resisted by the Liberal government, once the courts had 
ruled that sexual orientation was included in section 15 and that 
discriminating against same-sex relationships was a form of sexual 
orientation discrimination, there was little doubt that the denial of same-sex 
marriage or the government's failure to amend its other statutes that deal 
with spousal status, would have led to a long and costly legal battle. 
The discursive effects of the Charter in this policy area have been 
substantial. Both the Charterand the Supreme Court of Canada enjoy ahigh 
level of legitimacy among Canadians.30 Discrimination against lesbians 
and gay individuals and against same-sex relationships has been 
constructed and defined through the Charter as an issue of human rights. 
This can be contrasted with the political debate in the U. S. where the issue of 
same-sex marriage is routinely described as a "hot button" or an issue of 
morality. Although about 50% of Canadians opposed same-sex marriage in 
public opinion polls taken over the period from 2002-2007, the opponents 
of same-sex marriage have lost the discursive battle in framing this policy 
issue.31 The most recent public opinion research conducted over the 1990s 
and 2000s shows that legal change has framed the issue in this policy area 
and has legitimated the recognition of same-sex relationships in the eyes of 
Canadians.32 The discursive effects of the Charter in this area have been 
strengthened by the timing of the litigation in this area, which coincided 
with the George W. Bush era in American politics, which has only distanced 
Canadians from the American-style morality politics. Because of the 
Charter's strong identification with English Canadian nationalism, the 
protection of lesbians and gays from discrimination, and the issue of 
same-sex marriage have become defined as points of national pride in 
English-speaking Canada, a discursive result that is further reinforced by 
the fact that, since the secularization of the Quiet Revolution, Quebecers 
have prided themselves on their openness on sexuality and their place as the 
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first province to have implemented sexual orientation discrimination 
protections.33 
Therefore, in these ways, the impact of the Charter in this policy area has 
been significant. In instrumental terms, the Charter is a powerful weapon 
that, through the process of litigation and legislative response to court 
decisions, has produced a clear-cut policy in which discrimination against 
lesbians and gays and against same-sex relationships is constitutionally 
prohibited. It is difficult to see how this policy result could have been 
achieved as cleanly and as quickly without the Charter. On the discursive 
side, the Charter has strengthened and broadened the definition of human 
rights in this sector, creating obstacles for same-sex marriage opponents. 
These two areas of policy—criminal law and lesbian and gay rights— 
provide examples of the ways in which the Charter shapes policy outcomes 
through instrumental and discursive effects. 
The Effect of the Charter on Political Institutions 
The entrenchment of the Charter is usually presented as empowering courts 
relative to other political institutions. Right-wing Charter critics, 
especially those from the Reform/Alliance side of the revamped 
Conservative Party of Canada, argue that the courts have become too strong 
and that, with the Charter, courts have dictated to legislatures, enabling 
minority groups to circumvent the will of the democratic majority. 
Right-wing Charter critics argue that, by protecting minority groups, the 
Court oversteps its limits. This view of the Charter's effects may make 
good populist politics for right-wing politicians but it is not an accurate 
view of the effect of the Charter on Canadian political institutions.34 
Judicial review using a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights is an 
institutional innovation that was designed in part with the goal of ensuring 
that minorities were not swamped by majorities in a democratic political 
system. Therefore, it is not useful to frame a normative debate solely with 
reference to the courts' alleged role in protecting so-called "special 
interests" at the expense of the role of Parliament. In fact, recent scholarship 
suggests that the role of the courts in the wake of the Charter has been much 
more complex way than what has been suggested in debates over judicial 
activism. In this section, consideration is given the impact of the Charter 
and of the growth of human-rights consciousness on other political institutions 
including Parliament, the executive, and the functioning of federalism. 
Debates on judicial dialogue have opened up a discussion on the role of 
legislatures in policy-making on Charter issues. The advocates of judicial 
dialogue argue that Parliament plays a key role in responding to court 
decisions as well as in developing policies in light of the Charter and in light 
of the courts' likely reactions.35 In many cases, the courts explicitly leave 
certain policy issues to Parliament. In fiscal matters, for example, the Court 
has been increasingly deferential to Parliament. An excellent example is 
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provided by the question of pay equity. In the NAPE?6 case, the Court ruled 
on a clear-cut case of sex discrimination in which women were paid less 
than men. The Court recognized that there was a section 15 violation of 
women's right to equal treatment under the law; however, the Court 
deferred to Parliament by stating that the Court could not make rulings in 
which there were substantial public expenditures at issue.37 Similarly, in the 
Auton3* case concerning access to medical treatment for children diagnosed 
with autism, the Court recognized that there were substantial fiscal issues in 
play for governments and did not require that the government provide 
expensive medical services.39 Therefore, courts often directly invite a 
dialogue through the nature of the decision they make in a Charter case or in 
the type of remedy they require. Because Parliament responds to the courts 
and clearly plays a role in the development of policy on Charter issues, 
advocates of "judicial dialogue" have argued that judicial activists are 
wrong to point to the dominant role of courts versus legislatures in the 
Charter era.40 
As Janet Hiebert's work has shown, Parliament has a key role to play in 
debating and considering its legislative response on rights issues. For 
example, the area of criminal law, Parliament has debated the Court's 
rulings on questions such as the exclusion of evidence or the conditions 
under which warrants may be issued and has developed legislative 
responses that respond to die limits set by the courts. While critics of 
judicial activism see Parliament as acting as the headwaiter of the courts in 
these circumstances, a detailed consideration of the ways in which 
Parliament has responded on particular policy issues, shows that the courts 
rarely tell Parliament exactly what to do. Radier, Charter decisions set out 
the limits of state action and, in some cases, enjoin action from the state. 
However, there is almost always scope for interpretation of the Court's 
meaning in the legislative response or a choice of legislative means and 
instruments through which Parliament may respond. As Hiebert argues, 
legislatures and courts provide different answers to the fundamental rights' 
issues that are posed by the Charter Hiebert's relational approach suggests 
that both courts and legislatures have a role to play in assessing the ways in 
which state actions live up to the precepts of fundamental rights laid out in 
the Charter*1 
Therefore, rather than casting the impact of the Charter in terms of 
"judicial activism" versus "judicial dialogue," it is probably more accurate 
and more useful to see Parliament's response to the courts on Charter issues 
as evidence of the way in which the Charter has permeated Canadian 
political institutions in various ways.42 The Charter has certainly 
empowered Canadian courts, especially in specific areas such as criminal 
law and certain areas of human rights; as we have seen, this was in part the 
intent of the Charter's authors and it was a legal and constitutional 
framework that was strongly supported by legal and political elites at the 
time of the Charter's enactment. However, the Charterhas also influenced 
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other political institutions. Beyond the role of courts and legislatures, as 
highlighted in the "dialogue" approach and debates over judicial activism, 
the Charter has also shaped the executive, the bureaucracy, and the 
operation of Canadian federalism. 
There can be little doubt that the Charter shapes the operation of the 
executive and the way in which policy is developed through the 
bureaucracy and the process of executive decision making by prime 
minister and Cabinet. Kelly's work shows the way in which the bureaucracy 
Charter-proofs laws as legislation is written and the pivotal policy role that 
is now played by the Department of Justice at the federal level in vetting 
legislation. The impact of the Charter on the policy process is much more 
profound than a simple assessment of the cases in which the courts strike 
down an existing government practice, procedure, regulation, or legislation 
based on Charter grounds. Rather, Kelly's work suggests that the Charter is 
at work behind the scenes at the stage of the crafting of legislation.43 The 
Charter has altered the policy process by encouraging the definition of 
policy problems in terms of rights and has provided a strategic instrument 
for the reinforcement of this definition. Although many public policy issues 
in Canada were defined through rights claims prior to the Charter, there is 
no doubt that the entrenchment of a constitutional bill of rights has 
institutionalized the practice of evaluating policy in terms ofCharter rights. 
The Charter poses particular limits for politicians. While dialogue 
theory focuses on the role of Parliament and seeks to expand the oversight 
role of Parliament in the development of the policy response to Charter 
rulings, under most political circumstances, the role of the legislature in the 
Westminster system is limited with respect to policy-making. This is 
especially so given the strictures of the first-past-the-post electoral system 
that increase the incentives for party discipline. Canada has a high level of 
legislative cohesion compared to other democracies, which reduces the 
policy effectiveness of parliamentary deliberation and debate. While 
deliberation through the legislative committee system can provide a forum 
for broad-ranging debates on policy areas and, specifically, for the 
inclusion of civil society groups and other actors (including expert 
individuals) to deliberate with legislators on policy issues, decisions are 
made by the party leadership as a government. In the circumstances of 
maj ority government, the governing party controls the committees and may 
decide to accept or reject their advice. Even in circumstances of minority 
government, the process of negotiating and bargaining occurs among party 
leaders and elites and strengthens the hand of these actors in the policy 
process. 
Political scientists have noted for many years the rise of American-style 
presidential government among parliamentary democracies and have 
debated the extent to which prime ministers have become increasingly 
presidential and powerful. This tendency has always been pronounced in 
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Canada where the legislative process is dominated by the executive. Just as 
party discipline and the cohesion of the parties in the legislature is much 
greater in Canada than in other similar political systems, so too the 
dominance of the executive, especially in periods of majority government, 
is unrivalled among other Westminster systems.44 This tendency has been 
exacerbated and reinforced by the centralization of power in the hands of 
central agencies such as the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's 
Office (PMO), a centralization that began in the Trudeau era when the 
powers of central agencies were increased in order to counterbalance the 
power of the traditional bureaucracy.45 In this centralization of power, the 
Department of Justice plays a key role in the Charter era because of its 
Carter-proofing role that crosscuts policy jurisdictions. However, the 
centralization of power in the hands of the prime minister has also led to the 
strengthening of the political and partisan advisors, institutionally located 
in the PMO but also scattered among the offices of cabinet ministers. The 
accelerating mediatization of politics brought about the concentration of 
media ownership and the shift to even more globalized communications, 
means that party financing focuses on securing access to media. The rise of 
a new class of pollsters and professional lobbyists has displaced the 
traditional bureaucratic advice from the expert public servant. These trends 
have been described by Donald Savoie as leading to an unprecedented 
concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister.46 This 
centralization of power means that the concept of "judicial dialogue" must 
be tempered with the understanding that the discussion of the "legislative 
response" to Charter decision is often not a response that comes from the 
legislature in any meaningful sense. Rather, the "parliamentary" or 
"legislative" response comes from the executive, the prime minister and the 
cabinet, often acting on the advice of the expert lawyers in the Department 
of Justice as the dominant central decision maker in the public service on 
Charter issues, but also on the advice of pollsters and partisan political 
advisors who are concerned about the electoral fortunes of the prime 
minister and the governing party.47 
Of course, there is nothing new about the idea that policy decisions are 
made in response to the dynamics of electoral competition and we could 
argue that, indeed, such democratic responsiveness is how the system is 
supposed to work. Savoie 's point is that there are fewer checks and balances 
in the system than there once were because of the decline of the traditional 
advice of the public servant.48 In this sense, one could argue that the Charter 
plays a democratizing role in the Canadian political system by forcing 
politicians back to the advice of the expert public servant, whose role is to 
provide non-partisan advice, even if, in practice, the expertpublic servant is 
a lawyer whose advice will be bound by the limits of legal thinking and even 
if, in practice, the expert public servant's role as expert cannot always be 
easily be distinguished from a "political" role. Yet, the public servant who is 
paid by the state to serve all political parties over the course of her career is 
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in a different situation than a partisan political advisor who will be out of 
office if the prime minister loses an election. The Charter forces the legal 
expert front and centre in the policy process and this provides some check 
on the rampant growth of the for-profit political class of pollsters, lobbyists, 
and partisans. 
Aside from the C/brter'seffectsonthebalanceof "expert" vs. "partisan" 
advice received by the prime minister and Cabinet and the weight of this 
advice in decision making at the top level of the executive, the Charter has 
also affected the dynamics of electoral competition. Charter decisions have 
often played a role in political campaigns and, on occasion, have provided 
wedge issues for the rise of the partisan right. Much of the scholarly 
campaign by critics of judicial activism in both Canada and the U.S. has 
come from those associated with the partisan political right.49 In the U.S., 
these concerns have crystallized since the 1960s in an association between 
judicial activism and a range of social and political hot buttons such as 
abortion, gun control, the death penalty, and "gay rights." In Canada, the 
partisan right has pushed to politicize the Court's role in imitation of their 
more successful American counterparts, arguing that the Court has given 
too much power to specific groups and overstepped thé bounds of law into 
the realm of policy and politics. As member of Parliament for the Canadian 
Alliance, prior to his role as Justice Minister in the Harper minority 
government, Vic Toews well represented this view when he stated that 
"[u]nder the assumed authority of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms the courts have moved beyond their traditional role as arbiters of 
legal disputes and into the realm of policy making. Indeed, they have 
become politicians."50 Toews went on to say that "[a]n unaccountable and 
unelected judiciary has simply and erroneously appropriated the 
jurisdiction to legislate by judicial fiat matters of social policy." As Toews 
outlined his views to the House of Commons, the three groups that had 
benefited most from the overweening arrogance of the courts were federal 
prisoners, "child sexual predators," and same-sex couples.51 
If right-wing politicians wish to check the Court's power, the most 
effective vehicle for this would be the use of the notwithstanding clause, 
section 33 of the Charter, whose precise purpose is to allow legislatures 
(federal and provincial) to pass legislation notwithstanding sections 2 and 
7-15 of the Charter. For example, by using the notwithstanding clause, the 
Harper government could repeal the 2005 same-sex marriage legislation 
and pass federal legislation to ban same-sex marriage in Canada, declaring 
this legislation to operate notwithstanding the rights of same-sex couples as 
recognized and protected by the courts in the equality rights (section 15) of 
the Charter. The impact of the Charter on electoral competition has not 
been extensively canvassed in the literature; yet, considering the role of the 
Charter in providing electoral cannon fodder for party competition 
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provides another example of the way in which the Charter permeates the 
Canadian political system. 
Finally, the Charter has had important effects on that most important 
Canadian political institution—federalism. The political purpose of the 
Charter, as Peter Russell pointed out at its inception, was, in part, to deflect 
regional and provincial identities in favour of a stronger concept of 
Canadian citizenship and a stronger sense of attachment between the 
central government and the individual.52 The Charterhas set out new limits 
on Canadian federalism by empowering the individual and collective rights 
of citizens against governments, as Alan Cairns has argued.53 Provincial 
governments cannot assert their individual policy preferences in provincial 
jurisdiction if their preferences violate the rights outlined in the Charter 
Certainly, the power of provinces has been limited by the Charter. The 
Charter has had a particularly important direct effect in the area of language 
policy, as it was intended by its framers. Provincial language policies are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Charter. The Trudeau vision of Canadian 
federalism, in which individuals would enjoy the right of access to federal 
government services in French or English and the right to educate their 
children in English or French across Canada, is enshrined in section 23 of 
the Charter, which immediately collided with Quebec's language law, the 
PQ's Bill 101. It is important to note, however, that the Charterhas served 
as a lever—however imperfect—to force recalcitrant governments in other 
provinces such as Manitoba to provide better access to schools and services 
for their francophone minorities.54 As the case of Vriend shows, the Charter 
has also brought provinces into line with regard to fundamental rights and 
has created a common template for such rights in particular sectors, 
especially in the area of lesbian and gay rights. Because lesbian and gay 
rights policies have changed so radically since the coining into force of the 
equality rights section of the charter in 1985, they provide a strong example 
of a case in which provinces have been forced to adhere to a common human 
rights standard as a result of Court decisions. 
At the same time, this view of the Charter's role must be balanced by 
considering the larger context of the evolution of federalism over the last 
thirty years and reduced role of the federal government compared to 
provincial governments. For example, the forces of globalization as well as 
Canada's participation in the neo-liberal trade regimes of the World Trade 
Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement have limited 
both federal and provincial powers.55 Therefore, it is difficult to argue that 
the Charter has had clear-cut effects on centralizing or decentralizing 
Canadian federalism. Rather, the Charter reinforces human rights 
considerations in the operation of Canadian federalism and creates new 
limits on both federal and provincial powers. 
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The Effect of the Charter on Political Mobilization 
Most discussions of the Charter's effects focus on its concrete impact in 
shaping public policy. Indeed, it is often assumed that court decisions have 
direct effects on public policy and that, once the courts rule, governments 
are obligated to immediately take some concrete action to conform to the 
decision. Yet, in some cases, court decisions are not implemented and 
policies are not carried out in a clear-cut fashion. An example can be found 
in the case of language rights in Manitoba and other anglophone provinces. 
While the Charter has resulted in a series of court decisions in favour of the 
rights of minority francophone groups through English-speaking Canada, it 
is also true that these decisions have proven to be problematic in 
implementation, forcing francophone minority groups to return to court 
again and again in order to ensure implementation of court decisions. While 
it is true that the Charterhas strengthened the hand of the courts and that, as I 
have argued here, that it has permeated the operation of Canadian political 
institutions, we can also consider the Charter's effects beyond the realm of 
state institutions, the courts, and the evolution of jurisprudence on human 
rights by considering more broadly the effect of the Charter on political 
mobilization. By political mobilization, I mean simply the organization, 
strategies, and ideologies of civil society groups, especially those that seek 
to influence the state. Law on paper means nothing unless it is supported by 
social norms and practices. Exploring the impact of the Charter's human 
rights consciousness on societal actors is thus part and parcel of exploring 
the effectiveness and reality of legal change. In this section, I will briefly 
consider the effect of the Charter on the constitutional debate about human 
rights and the effect of the Charter on social movements and partisan 
political party conflict. 
During the debates on the Charter's entrenchment and in the period 
following, a number of observers noted that the advent of the Charter had 
empowered citizens and citizen groups in constitutional debate and that this 
process of citizen empowerment could be contrasted with the traditional 
intergovemmentalism.56 Federalism was the business of governments. By 
definition, intergovemmentalism referred to the dynamic process of 
government-to-government negotiation, especially in the postwar era of 
executive federalism in which the growing Canadian welfare state was 
managed through federal-provincial transfers and other forms of 
intergovernmental coordination. As Richard Simeon pointed out in his 
well-known study of the negotiation of the Canada Pension Plan, the 
process of intergovernmental negotiation tended to be closed to outside 
group influence.57 This meant that considerations such as the human rights 
of citizens or groups of citizens could not easily find entry into debates 
dominated by considerations of federalism, and that human rights issues 
were often redefined in terms of federal and provincial powers.58 Even 
when courts were faced with human rights issues in the pre-Charter era, the 
Canadian constitution provided more levers for making decisions on 
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federalism grounds than on human rights grounds (with the exception of 
section 93's guarantees for denominational schools). The original 
"problem" that sparked the constitutional debates was the problem of 
constitutional amendment and debates on various formulas for amendment 
revolved around the rights of governments in constitutional amendment 
rather than the rights of citizens. As Alan Cairns pointed out, the 
constitutional rounds following the Charter's entrenchment—the two 
rounds that attempted to bring Quebec into the Constitution, the Meech 
Lake Accord round (1987-1990) and the Charlottetown Accord round 
(1992)—the Constitution of governments came into conflict with the 
Constitution of citizens. As Cairns argued, the Charter created a new 
political dynamic in which citizens (as individuals and as groups) had 
received constitutional recognition of their rights and, therefore, had 
become constitutional actors with powers and resources of their 
own—powers and resources that were provided and legitimated by the 
Charter.™ 
This conflict between the rights of governments and the rights of citizens 
played out through the Meech Lake and Charlottetown rounds. The 
constitutional changes that were intended to give more power to the 
government of Quebec as the national representative of Québécois or that 
were intended to give more powers to all the provinces as a means of 
propitiating Quebec nationalism and Western regionalism clashed with the 
rights guarantees of the Charter The Charter provided clear-cut 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights for many groups in 
Canadian society that had never had such protections before including 
women, ethnocultural minorities, Aboriginal peoples and others. The 
prospect of the coming into force of section 15 (equality rights) of the 
Charter in 1985, had already sparked major political debate and 
consultation through the parliamentary committee hearing and stakeholder 
groups were keen to ensure that the new Charter would not be a dead letter 
like the Canadian Bill of Rights, but that it would be a generously 
interpreted living document that would provide a higher standard of human 
rights protections for Canadians. Therefore, when there appeared to be a 
conflict between the Charter on the one hand and the provisions of the 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords on the other hand, the 
constitutional debates pitted the human rights ideas of the Charter against 
the national vision of both Quebecers and Aboriginal peoples and against 
the rights of governments, especially provincial governments, which 
sought to expand provincial jurisdiction and rights in the constitutional 
debates. 
The clash between the Charter-based vision of human rights and the 
national vision of constitutional rights came to a head in December 1988, 
when the government of Quebec acted to maintain language laws ensuring 
French predominance on public signage.60 Quebec exempted itself from 
language laws of the Charter in order to defend its national vision of the 
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right of the provincial government to control language policy and the right 
of a nation to protect its cultural identity. This clash between the human 
rights of the Charter and the collective national rights of Quebecers 
galvanized opposition to the Meech Lake Accord and set the stage for the 
conflicts of the subsequent constitutional round. Through the 
Charlottetown Accord, Charter stakeholders, such as the women's 
movement in English-speaking Canada, argued against provincial 
decentralization and against constitutionally entrenched legal guarantees 
of Quebec's distinctiveness that might undermine the recognition of 
women's rights. A similar dynamic occurred in the debate on the 
application of the Charter in Aboriginal communities. Therefore, the 
Charter reinforced the political position of human rights stakeholders. As 
Cairns argues, by providing constitutional recognition to Charter 
stakeholders, the constitutional change of 1982 provided an opening for a 
much broader range of citizen participation in constitutional debates. Much 
of that opening was seized by the Charter stakeholders. Although the 
constitutional debates of 1987-1992 resulted in an impasse, they produced 
a rich debate among political actors on the relationship between human 
rights, nationalism, and constitutionalism—one that fuelled Canada's 
unique contributions to political theorizing about minority and human 
rights.61 For the first time, groups such as First Nations and the women's 
movement, which had historically been marginalized in Canadian 
constitution making, were included and officially recognized as having the 
right to participate in the constitutional conversation. This change in the 
process of political mobilization can be attributed at least in part to the 
impact of the Charter. 
The Charter has also had important effects for the ways in which groups 
mobilize in the political process. First, the Charter also encourages apolicy 
discourse in which problems are cast in terms of rights and many analysts 
see this process as one that reinforces neo-liberalism. For example, Ran 
Hirschl argues that judicial empowerment has led to increased power for 
elites, especially economic elites, to dominate the democratic process at the 
expense of other interests.62 The Critical Legal Studies School of legal 
analysis emphasizes that the legal system favours certain types of claims 
and produces and reinforces the existing power system. Judy Fudge's 
analysis of Charter decisions shows that claims for recognition are much 
more likely to succeed in Charter jurisprudence than claims with fiscal 
implications. Thus, claims for same-sex relationship recognition succeed 
because, mainly, these are claims for recognition that do not cost the state; in 
contrast, the pay equity claims of women are not recognized by the court 
even though they entail a straightforward claim of sex discrimination.63 
The perils of Charter-based human rights discourse are also exemplified 
by the ongoing failure of the government to remedy problems that might 
seem to fall clearly within the ambit of human rights. Thus, legal and 
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Charter-based strategies are not always the best choice for collective 
actors. For example, violence against women has not been remedied, 
despite the legal guarantees of equality in the Charter. In section 15, the 
Charter states that discrimination on the grounds of sex (and other grounds) 
is prohibited and, in section 28, the Charter states that all of the rights in it 
are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. Yet, it is very 
challenging to litigate with the Charter in defence of the right of women to 
be free of male violence. As discussed, those accused of assault are 
protected by the Charter's guarantees of due process, which were intended 
by the framers of the Charter to protect the accused against police power 
and to ensure that the police were accountable for their conduct.64 The 
problem of violence against women is framed as a policy issue that entails a 
clash of rights, between the accused and the victims of violence. 
Nonetheless, as a public policy issue, violence against women might be 
defined as a question of social, political, and economic justice. As the 
Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres points out, violence 
against women must also be seen against the backdrop of the declining role 
of the welfare state, the erosion of the social safety net, the decline in social 
assistance rates, and the overall increase in economic inequality in 
Canadian society. Economic inequality leaves women with fewer options 
and means that collective resources, such as battered women's shelters and 
rape crisis centres, lead underfunded and precarious lives.65 The Charter 
does not encourage the framing of the issue in terms of economic and social 
inequality and the scaled-based welfare state because these 
socio-economic issues are not included in its mandate. 
Second, the Charter also affects the ways in which groups mobilize in the 
policy process by privileging litigation strategies over other forms of 
political mobilization. Early on in the Charter's life, Michael Mandel 
argued that the entrenchment of the Charter would lead to the legalization 
of politics in Canada by defusing grassroots political activism in favour of 
litigation. Mandel's argument focussed on the case of Operation Dismantle 
that attempted to stop nuclear testing in Canada. He argued that the legal 
opening provided by the Charter encouraged the peace movement to 
litigate and that this process undermined the movement's ability to mount 
grassroots mobilization campaigns.66 The Charter's structuring effect on 
political organizing can also be seen in the politics of the women's 
movement and the politics of the lesbian and gay movement. Both these 
movements are deeply diverse with a large number of grassroots 
organizations at the urban and local levels. Yet, at the pan-Canadian level, 
each movement has only one organization and, in both cases, it is an 
organization that focuses on Charter litigation. Since the demise of the 
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) as the 
pan-Canadian voice of the women's movement, the Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), a Charter litigation fund, is the most 
high profile voice for the national women's movement. In the case of 
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lesbian and gay rights, Egale, the main national voice in this sector, has 
devoted considerable energy to litigation under the Charter. In these cases, 
then, the Charter encourages social movement organizations to focus on 
the litigation of human rights claims rather than pursuing politics by other 
means. 
Finally, in considering the effect of the Charter on political mobilization, 
it is important to think about the way in which human rights play out in 
partisan political competition. The Charter has played an increasingly 
important role in partisan party competition over the course of the 1990s 
and 2000s. The Liberals have successfully exploited Charter issues for 
their own political gain by claiming the mantle of equality rights as the 
particular project of the Liberal Party. In the 2004 election, Paul Martin 
offered to eliminate the notwithstanding clause, a gesture that, however 
impracticable, symbolized the Liberal identification with the Charter*1 
Countering the rise of the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance and, since 
2003, the revamped Conservative Party of Canada, the Liberals have used 
the Charter to point to the differences between their party and their 
increasingly right-wing political opponents. On economic and social policy 
issues, the Liberals have drifted steadily to the right since 1993. During 
their period of opposition to the Mulroney Conservatives, the party painted 
itself as a champion of progressive Canadians in opposition to NAFTA and 
in defence of the collectivist welfare state. Yet, as soon as the Liberals were 
elected under Jean Chrétien in 1993, they began their move to the right, 
starkly epitomized by Paul Martin's 1995 budget from which 
intergovernmental transfers for social policy have never recovered. 
Martin's slash-and-burn return to balanced budgets and the Chrétien 
government's embrace of NAFTA were consistent with the party's 
long-term habit of running from the left and governing from the right.68 
However, the danger in this strategy was the vulnerability of the party to 
the charge that it had drifted so far to the right that it has become 
indistinguishable from the Conservatives. The disarray of the right as a 
result of the bust-up of the Mulroney electoral coalition and the rise of the 
five-party system with the Bloc and the Reform Party allowed the Liberals 
to rule unchallenged for a decade. However, throughout this period, the 
Liberals used social liberalism to distinguish themselves from their 
opponents on the right and this strategy crystallized around the issue of 
same-sex marriage. How a political party and government that could barely 
bring itself to officially amend the Canadian Human Rights Act to include 
sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination in 1996 became a political 
party that passed legislation to legalize same-sex civil marriage in 2005 is a 
story that hinges on the political role of the Charter in Canadian politics. 
After the persistent pattern of court rulings in favour of lesbian and gay 
rights under the Charter from 1998 on, the Liberals reluctantly embraced 
this cause, turning a set of policies that were personally uncomfortable for 
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Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin and policies that were not supported 
by the entire Liberal caucus, into a cause with which the Liberal Party is 
now identified. The party exploits the social conservatism of the right to 
vaunt its own role as author and defender of the Charter on issues such as 
same-sex marriage, drawing a link between the Liberal Party's defence for 
the rights of gays and lesbians and its defence of the rights of ethnocultural 
minorities, its history as the political party that opened up Canadian 
immigration on a non-racial basis, and its role as defender of "Canadian 
values"—values equated with the Charter. In this way, the Charter has 
become identified with nationalist discourse in English-speaking Canada 
and has become a marker of Canada's difference from the U.S. 
Conclusion 
Recent historical scholarship has reminded us of the roots of human rights 
struggles in the period prior to the Charter, The Charter was, in part, the 
product of a long-running debate in Canadian politics, dating back to the 
negotiation of the Confederation agreement and before in which British 
North Americans and, later, Canadians, thought about how to develop 
parliamentary political institutions and how to recognize legal and political 
rights based on differences such as religion. The post-World War I period 
saw the beginnings of political activism on issues of civil liberties and racial 
discrimination, an activism that culminated in the Diefenbaker Bill of 
Rights. The failings of this initial foray, in part, provided the background 
and political support for the Trudeau government's initiatives in the 
constitutional debates of the 1970s and early 1980s, leading to the 
Charter's entrenchment. 
The effects of the Charter on public policy, political institutions, and 
political mobilization have occurred, in part, because of the broad social 
and political support for human rights in Canada, itself a product of 
activism, political struggle, and strategic litigation. The Charter has 
realized John Diefenbaker's goal in working for a statutory bill of rights, 
namely to force Parliament to consider and debate rights issues. While 
Diefenbaker was principally concerned with civil liberties and he 
envisioned this conversation about rights as occurring within the confines 
of Parliament, the effects of the constitutionally entrenched Charter have 
been much broader and deeper. Not only has the Charter shaped public 
policy outcomes in specific areas such as criminal law and lesbian and gay 
rights, it has also framed public debates and shaped the process by which 
legislation is developed and drafted. While the Charter has strengthened 
the hand of the judiciary relative to other political institutions, the 
discursive and instrumental effects of the Charter are also felt in other 
political institutions such as the executive and Parliament as well as the 
operation of federalism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has become 
an important factor in structuring political mobilization and debate, 
encouraging civil society organizations to stake their political claims in 
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terms of Charter rights (for better or ill) and contributing to the partisan 
competition between political parties in federal politics. From the 
perspective of the twenty-five years since its entrenchment, the Charterhas 
permeated Canadian political debates, political institutions, and political 
mobilization and has become an important fixture in Canadian political life. 
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